

Top Secret

25X1



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

*RCES
(Records
Center)*

Central Intelligence Bulletin

Top Secret

c173

19 September 1967

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010300150001-0

Approved For Release 2002/10/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010300150001-0

[redacted]
19 September 1967

25X1

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

[redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

Nigeria: Federal forces pressing Biafrans harder.
(Page 3)

United Nations: Assembly will stress Middle East
and arms control. (Page 4)

Syria-Israel: Syrian troop buildup (Page 5)

[redacted]

25X1


Brazil: Currency in trouble (Page 5)

[redacted]

25X1

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

SOUTHERN NIGERIA



25X1

19 Sep 67 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map

Nigeria: Federal forces are pressing the Biafrans harder but seem unlikely to win a decisive military victory soon.

Federal army elements operating in northwestern Biafra have moved south of Nsukka along the main road. Advance units may now be within 25 miles of Enugu. Federal progress in this sector has been extremely slow, however, and could bog down as supply lines lengthen and Biafran resistance grows more stubborn.

Federal troops finally have captured Ikom, a key town near the Cameroon border. Patrols have also been reported on the Calabar-Mamfe road, the last road exit from Biafra to Cameroon. Biafran Army units in this area apparently fled before federal troops arrived. Difficult terrain, however, will impede further federal progress toward Calabar.

In the Mid-Western State, the Biafran position is eroding.

25X1

In addition, there is evidence of a federal build-up in the Escravos River area in preparation for a new push northward. Ibo civilians, including Mid-Western Ibos, are said to be fleeing the river ports as well as Benin City itself.

In the face of the forthcoming consultative mission to Nigeria from the Organization of African Unity, Lagos will try to press its military advantage even harder. The Biafrans also will probably attempt to change this situation before the six heads of state arrive, perhaps as early as Thursday.

25X1

United Nations: The Middle East and the draft nonproliferation treaty will probably dominate the 22nd session of the UN General Assembly opening today.

The General Assembly is not expected to show any forward movement on Middle East issues. Moscow probably will not take any new initiatives and indeed may be backing away from the agreement reached with the US at the close of the special session in July. The Tito proposal specifying withdrawal without an end to belligerency is apt to be raised but probably will not attract any more support than a similar Yugoslav resolution in the last session.

A number of arms control questions come before the Assembly every year, such as a comprehensive test ban treaty and nuclear free zones, but the draft nonproliferation treaty will receive most of the attention this year. The tone of the debate will depend on the degree of success achieved by the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee now meeting in Geneva. The prospects are brighter for eventual agreement on a safeguards article now that the Soviet Union has offered a compromise which meets many of the demands of the EURATOM countries.

Other topics which may come before the Assembly are apartheid, South-West Africa and Rhodesia, Vietnam (though not on the agenda), Chinese representation, and Korea. One of the Latin American members may submit an item on Cuban intervention.

25X1

NOTES

Syria-Israel: A Syrian troop build-up along the cease-fire line during the past week probably is designed as a show of force and as a demonstration that Damascus is still belligerently anti-Israel even if other Arabs are trying "moderation." [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] the Syrians may have established a fire-power advantage in the cease-fire area. The Israelis, however, have air superiority, and would not hesitate to crush the Syrian forces again if the latter attack. [redacted]

25X1

Brazil: A sharp deterioration in Brazil's foreign assets position may force another currency devaluation. The government devalued by 23 percent in February 1967, but black-market prices on foreign exchange have since risen about 20 percent above the official rate. The need for immediate devaluation would lessen if the government tightens credit or if coffee exports pick up. The Brazilians will probably not decide what to do until after the IMF - World Bank meeting next week in Rio de Janeiro. [redacted]

25X1

19 Sep 67

5

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A010300150001-0
Top Secret



Top Secret